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The Native Vegetation Conservation Act was introduced on January 1
st 1998 
to protect native grassland and woodland in New South Wales.  The Act has 
limited clearing of native vegetation and development to crops and pasture, 
has protected biodiversity, and may have enhanced soil and water 
conservation. But an analysis of variations in the prices paid for farm land in 
Moree Plains Shire, with the complementary hedonic and bargaining methods, 
shows how buyers, sellers, and the market as a whole, value the characteristics 
of the land.  It shows that the Act has led to substantial losses in land values 
for the farmers.  The Act has imposed higher costs on those who had kept 
most vegetation, and on those who most need to retain their options to clear 
and develop.  Stewardship payments will alleviate the financial situation for 
some and property plans will provide long-term security for both farmer and 
vegetation.  But the magnitudes of the losses suggest that introduction of 
individual policies like these must be preceded by a review of the whole 
strategy of vegetation protection in New South Wales.  We must first decide 
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1. Introduction 
Government objectives for the management of a nation’s natural resources normally 
include increases in environmental protection, increases in the standard of living, and 
improvements in social equity.  But policies to provide gains on one objective often 
lead to losses on another, and gains to the whole community are often accompanied 
by losses to particular groups within the community.  
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act NSW was introduced on 1
st January 
1998 to reflect the growing community concern for the future of native vegetation. 
The Act was designed to prevent inappropriate clearing, to manage the remaining 
native vegetation sustainably, to prevent further economic loss, to streamline the 
administration of native vegetation management, and to encourage landholder and 
community involvement in vegetation management (NSW Department of Land and 
Water Conservation, 1998). State Environmental Planning Policy 46 (SEPP 46) had 
been introduced in August 1995 with the same objectives and the same restrictions, to 
begin the process of policy formulation. 
The gains for the wider community are, however, accompanied by losses to 
the farming community.  The Native Vegetation Conservation Act removes farmers' 
rights to clear or develop native woodland or native grassland, except for certain 
minor exemptions such as cutting seven trees per hectare for farm purposes.  The Act 
then permits development on application by the farmer and consent from the 
Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC).  The balance between 
protection and clearing was to be determined by the Regional Vegetation 
Management Committees that were established under the Act.  These committees 
were to prepare regional vegetation management plans, which must identify the social 
and economic aspects of native vegetation management, and consider the economic 
viability of land uses (NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation, 1997).   
The requirement to retain native vegetation on farms can impose several kinds 
of cost on the landholder, including the loss of income because use of land with native 
vegetation is restricted to grazing, and the associated loss of land value.  They also 
include the continuing costs of maintaining on-farm conservation reserves, and all the 
different kinds of transactions costs that accompany applications to the DLWC for 
consent to develop land with native vegetation.  The Act is, of course, just one of a 
wide variety of possible policy instruments for protecting biodiversity.  There may be  4 
cheaper, more effective, more equitable options rather than this regulatory approach.  
But the costs of the Act must be identified to help formulate better strategies and 
options. 
Eight years have passed since original SEPP 46 was introduced and so all 
these costs will have become apparent.  A formal assessment of how the Act has 
affected the distribution of costs is therefore timely, and an intensive case study 
covering the whole area of a regional vegetation management committee is a useful 
way to do this. 
The objectives of the paper may therefore be summarised as follows:  
• to assess the loss in farm land value due to the Act, 
• to examine the distribution of these losses, and 
• to inform the formation of policy on vegetation protection in New South Wales.  
The price that farmers actually pay for land is a measure of their expectations 
from it and reflects the values from the all the characteristics of the land - - as seen by 
the farmer.  The price will therefore “capture” the short-term income earning capacity 
of the land, and long-term benefits from reductions in land degradation due to the 
retention of trees and other vegetation. Further, prices are actual measures of worth 
because they are actually paid in the market and land is the main capital asset of the 
farmer.  The analysis is therefore based on prices paid for farm land in Moree Plains 
Shire NSW.  This area has been characterised by the active clearing of native 
vegetation up to the introduction of the Act, the diversity of its agriculture, and the 
changes in its agricultural enterprises from year to year. 
Section 2 reviews literature on the relationships between regulations, land 
values, and the measurement of the loss in land value.  Sections 3 and 4 cover the 
methods to analyse the formation of land prices, namely the hedonic approach and the 
bargaining approach.  The data are described in Section 5, and the analysis is 
summarised in Section 6.  The results presented in Section 7, and the Section 8 
comprises the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2 Native vegetation, land values and opportunity costs 
2.1 Land values and constraints on land use 
Economic theory suggests that regulations to constrain farmer behaviour tend to 
reduce farm income and so reduce land values.  These losses in land value are  5 
opportunity costs, and the circumstances in which they occur have been widely 
discussed.  For example, Spalatro and Provcencher (2001), Knaap (1985) and 
Vaillancourt and Monty (1985) all argue that regulations to constrain farm 
development generally reduce the market value of the land.  Henneberry and Barrows 
(1990) reach the same conclusion but add the rider that regulation on one farm may 
sometimes confer external benefits on another and so raise the value of its land. 
Peterson (1974) identifies three effects of a regulation that constrains the 
actions of landowners - - a fiscal effect (lower land values which lower tax 
collections), a development effect (reductions in income from constraints on use) and 
an amenity effect (changes in unpriced benefits from the preservation of 
environmental amenities).  Spalatro and Provencher (2001) argued that very few 
empirical studies have distinguished the development effect from the amenity effect 
and then estimated both for zoning of lakefront amenities in Wisconsin. 
Nickerson and Lynch (2001) examined the influence of regulations, in the 
United States of America, to retain land in farming. Lower prices per hectare were 
paid for larger parcels, parcels further from employment centres, and forested land.  
Lower prices were also paid where regulations constrain use of the land.  But the 
effect of the constraint was not statistically significant perhaps because buyers did not 
expect the regulation to be binding in the future. 
 
2.2 Land values and native vegetation 
Empirical studies on the formation of prices for farm land in NSW also indicate that 
land values are reduced when the quantity of vegetation increases, and define the 
circumstances when this can happen. They also support the underlying belief that 
environmental quality differences are capitalised into land values.  Walpole, 
Lockwood and Miles (1998) analysed sales of 124 farms across southern NSW and 
northeast Victoria. The effect of retention of native vegetation on land values was 
complex, but is well summarised by Walpole (2000).  Increases in the area of native 
vegetation reduced land values when more than 50 per cent of the property was native 
vegetation.  But increases in the area had little effect on land value when less than 50 
per cent of the property was native vegetation. 
The dieback of eucalypts was associated with increases in the value of 
farmland on grazing properties on the Northern Tablelands in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Sinden, Jones, and Fleming 1983).  At this time, some 16 per cent of each property  6 
was still covered in healthy native woodland. Land value increased as the quantity of 
healthy woodland increased until it covered some 20 to 25 per cent of the property.  
After this percentage, increases in native vegetation were associated with reductions 
in land value. 
In his role as a land valuer, Spackman (2000) compared recent individual sales 
of cleared-and-cultivated properties with uncleared-and-livestock properties in the 
Liverpool Plains.  A hectare of cultivated land typically sold for $600 more than a 
hectare of land with native grasses that had to be retained under the Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act.  Marano (1991) provides empirical evidence that regulations to 
protect native vegetation in South Australia have systematically reduced land values, 
and Fensham and Sattler (2002) report the same effect in Queensland.   
 
2.3 A general relationship to identify opportunity costs 
These analyses, theory and empirical observation, all suggest that the relationship 
between land value and native vegetation tends to follow the trends of Figure 1.  Land 
value increases as the percentage of native vegetation on a property increases from 
PC0 up to some point PCm.  In this phase, the benefits of the extra woodland (as 
shelter for stock or conservation of the soil and water for crops) exceed the costs from 
loss of productive area.  But in the next phase from PCm to PCt, increases in the 
percentage of native vegetation reduce land values.  Now the costs from lost 
productive area exceed the increases in amenity benefits.  Clearly, two kinds of 
effects underlie these trends, namely the “amenity” effects of shelter and 
conservation, and the “development” effect of immediate income and land value 
income. The amenity effects dominate up to PCm and the development effects 
dominate thereafter. 
The percentage of vegetation at the point of inflection (PCm), the slopes (from 
PC 0 to PCm, and PCm to PCt), and the values of V0 and Vm will vary from enterprise 
to enterprise and region to region. Nevertheless, this specification allows for native 
vegetation to enhance the value of a property (up to PCm) where it covers a small 
portion of a crop farm or a larger proportion of a grazing property.  The specification 
also provides a framework to measure opportunity costs and identify the losses in land 
value due to the Act. 
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2.4 The measurement of opportunity cost 
The Native Vegetation Conservation Act regulates the farmer’s behaviour by 
restricting development, to crops or pasture, of land with native vegetation.  The 
immediate opportunity cost is the income that is lost from the most productive 
alternative use of the land where this constraint is imposed.  This loss of income will 
be directly associated with a loss of land value.   The concept of opportunity cost is 
simple and direct, but it is less simple to apply and measure. The complexities 
concern the identification of the base case for the comparison, the distinction between 
cost to the farmer and cost to the community, and the need to ensure that empirical 
analyses do not overstate the costs. 
The base case of any assessment of the Act should be the situation without the 
Act, and so current land values with the Act should be compared to values for the 
same property before the Act.  Such a time series of values is rarely available, but a 
useful alternative is to compare current land values of different properties with 
different amounts of vegetation.  The value of a property with little vegetation now is 
analogous to the value of a property with much more vegetation before the Act, when 
the owner could clear the vegetation if he so wished.  This of course is very different 
from comparing (a) the present value under a regional vegetation plan, against (b) the 
value before the plan but after the Act is introduced.  The former may be a good 
estimate of current land value, but the latter is not an appropriate base. 
The opportunity cost (OC) to the community may differ from that to the 
farmer.  If the land could be cleared and used profitably, the restrictions of the Act 
will lead to an opportunity cost to the community whether or not the farmer actually 
clears.   In simple terms, for a given farm: 
OC to community = LV without Act, as if all could be cleared – LV with Act  (1) 
Refer to Figure 1, and a farm with PCf native vegetation: 
OC to the community  = Vm-Vf       ( 2 )  
As long as the land could be cleared and developed profitably, the community loses 
land value whether or not the farmer clears or has any intention to clear. But the 
opportunity cost to the farmer is based the value of land with the amount of vegetation 
that he would have actually retained. Refer to the same farm where farmer would 
clear down to PCd: 
OC to landholder = LV without Act, but with the vegetation he would keep 
       –   L V   w i t h   t h e   A c t       ( 3 )   8 
     = Vd - Vf        ( 4 )  
 The opportunity cost to the community may therefore be higher than that to the 
farmer.   
Consider now the farmer’s situation in more detail.  We must distinguish 
between the following two kinds of cost.  (a) The opportunity cost to the farmer of a 
private decision to retain vegetation.  (b) The opportunity cost to the farmer of the 
community decision to impose restrictions on clearing.  Case (a) arises from the 
farmer’s comparison of all the benefits of retention to him against the costs to him.  If 
the decision were economically rational and he retains vegetation, the sum of all the 
benefits exceeds the opportunity costs to him. He will likely bear an opportunity cost 
when he sells his land, even though there was no loss in real income to him up to that 
time.  Case (b) arises directly from the clearing controls and the farmer’s intention to 
clear and develop and is the relevant case to analyse. 
The framework of Figure 1 and these concepts of opportunity cost guide the 
analysis.  In the empirical calculations that follow, the opportunity costs and land 
values are net of any costs to bring land into production. The calculations of losses in 
land value infer the rights to clear vegetation as before the Act.  The opportunity costs 
will refer to the farmer’s losses.  To capture the various influences on the farmer, the 
probability of wanting to retain native vegetation, the size of the area concerned, and 
the potential uses of the land are all included as variables in the analysis.   Sensitivity 
analyses will be undertaken of the effect of the amount of clearing on the loss of land 
value.   
 
3 The hedonic approach 
3.1 The theoretical model 
Hedonic models of land values rest on the belief that the sale price represents the 
equilibrium price for the particular bundle of characteristics of the particular parcel of 
land (Maler 1977).  The hedonic approach to valuing these characteristics, from the 
market price, has two distinct stages.  First. sale prices are regressed on characteristics 
to which both buyer and seller can respond to give the "hedonic equation".  Second, 
marginal implicit prices of the characteristic are estimated for each property from this 
hedonic equation, and are used to estimate willingness to pay functions. The  9 
distinction between the two stages is usually attributed to Rosen (1974) who 
developed the theoretical models.  
The approach is now well established.  For example, Nickerson and Lynch 
(2001) used the method to value the costs of constraints that retain land in agriculture 
in Maryland.  King and Sinden (1988) applied it to assess the contribution of soil 
conservation to land value in New South Wales, and Spalatro and Provencher (2001) 
used it to value amenity benefits from zoning regulations on lakefronts in Wisconsin. 
In an agricultural or environmental context, the hedonic equation describes the 
price of land as a function of the productive, amenity, and environmental 
characteristics that both seller and buyer respond to in the market place (Freeman 
1979). If P is the price of the land and Ki the characteristics: 
P= f(Ki)       ( 5 )  
The partial derivatives of P with respect to the Ki’s are the implicit marginal prices of 
the characteristics Pi(K).  
In the second stage, the marginal prices of a characteristic for each property 
are calculated from the quantity of the characteristic actually present.  These marginal 
prices are the increase in the price paid to obtain one more unit of a desirable 
characteristic.  They become the dependent variables from which demand (6) and 
supply (7) functions are estimated for the characteristic. 
Pi(K) = f(Ki,  B)     (6) 
Pi(K) = f(Ki,  S)    (7)   
where B and S are vectors of buyer and seller characteristics respectively. These 
vectors enable the identification of demand and supply. 
If the buyers are identical, and so have identical utility functions, management 
skills, and incomes, the B vector drops out of equation (6), and equation (5) identifies 
the bid function of the buyer.  The second stage equation (6) then identifies an inverse 
demand function for the characteristic.  If sellers are identical and so face the same 
input prices, employ the same technology, and have the same management skills, the 
S vector drops out of equation (7).  Equation (5) then becomes a sellers offer function, 
and observations on Pi(K) and the Ki  identify an inverse supply function for the 
characteristic.  If buyers are identical and sellers are identical, the good would appear 
in the market as a single bundle of characteristics - - a case clearly not present in the 
land market.  10 
There remain several theoretical and empirical issues in the application of the 
method.  Ribaudo and Shortle (2001) suggest the most important issue is whether the 
land market is competitive and in equilibrium. The approach assumes that each 
household is in equilibrium with respect to the vector of characteristic prices and that 
the vector is the one that just clears the market.   If the market is thin or adjusts 
slowly, the estimated marginal implicit prices do not accurately measure household 
willingness to pay. Further, participants in the market must be able to observe the 
levels of the particular characteristic, to adjust their bid and offer prices to those 
levels, and then interact in a competitive manner (Willis and Foster 1983). 
 
3.2 Application of the model 
The procedure to estimate the hedonic equation (5) depends upon the data available 
on the area affected by regulations to protect native vegetation.  The only information 
may be whether the individual parcel is affected or not.  In this case, a variable 
DUMA is defined as 1 = affected or 0 otherwise (Nickerson and Lynch 2001). The 
empirical form of equation (5) becomes: 
LVALUEj = a + bKij + cDUMAj +ej      ( 8 )  
where LVALUE is now the market price, Kij is a vector of characteristics i of the farm 
j, e is the error term, and a, b and c (and d below) are parameters to be estimated. 
All farmland in New South Wales is affected by the Native Vegetation 
Conservation Act, but different parcels have different amounts of native vegetation 
left.  When the percentage of native vegetation can be measured directly for each 
parcel (PCNV), the empirical form becomes: 
 LVALUEj = a + bKij + cPCNVj + ej      (9) 
This equation can be labelled "Model 1: the basic hedonic model".  It "captures" the 
trends of Figure 1 through the inclusion of variables LVALUE and PCNV, and so will 
be applied. 
Equations (8) and (9) assume that all observations refer to sales within the 
same time period, so only the cross-sectional variations in characteristics of the farm 
(K), including the percentage of native vegetation (PCNV), need to be included.  If 
the observations covered to a period of time (t), the longitudinal variations in other 
explanatory variables must be included as well. These other market variables could be 
commodity prices, exchange rates, loan rates, and cyclical economic factors that  11 
affect both buyers and sellers. Where M is a vector of such market factors that affect 
both buyer and seller, and with n of them: 
  LVALUEjt = a + bKij + cPCNVj + dMnjt + ej            (10) 
Models (8), (9), and (10) assume that the underlying processes of price 
formation are the same for all parcels of land, irrespective of how much is native 
vegetation and so affected by the Act. 
The error term ej may include the effect of unobserved characteristics of the 
land, the buyer, seller, or the market.  These unobserved characteristics may be related 
to the decisions to buy or sell the land and so lead to a sample selection problem.  The 
obvious a priori expectation is that land with more native vegetation is less likely to 
be purchased and so less likely to enter the sampling frame.  The variable PCNV is 
included already and allows for allows an ex post comparison of percentages of native 
vegetation in the sample and the Shire as a whole.  The second obvious expectation is 
that buyers are more likely to enter a market that is regulated by the Act if they are 
willing to conserve native vegetation in the way that is prescribed by the Act.  This 
characteristic of buyers was observed and data were collected for it, but it is excluded 
from the hedonic equation that includes characteristics to which both buyer and seller 
can react. 
If the influence of market structure changes across the sample, if the process 
of price formation differs across the sample or between buyers and sellers, and if 
market factors affect buyer and seller differently, then the bargaining approach may 
be used instead of the hedonic approach (King and Sinden 1994).  In this formulation, 
a variable (DUTY) is included for the buyers' willingness to conserve native 
vegetation as prescribed by the Act. 
 
4 The bargaining approach 
4.1 The theoretical basis 
In reality, market prices are a response to buyer characteristics, seller characteristics 
and to the interaction of buyer and seller in the market - - as well as a response to the 
characteristics of the land.  The hedonic approach necessarily ignores the former set 
of data and concentrates on the latter characteristics of the land.  The bargaining 
approach seeks to model this broader scenario, with some advantages and some  12 
disadvantages, and some differences in the information that becomes available for 
policy formation. 
Walras (1900) was an early contributor to the discussion of tatonnement 
processes - - the search for equilibrium and the adjustment from an initial position to a 
pseudo-equilibrium.  One branch of the bargaining and adjustment literature addresses 
strategic bargaining between agents representing groups of individuals (Nash 1950 
and Wolinsky 1987). Another branch concerns bargaining in markets where buyers 
and sellers bargain over both price and quantity.  This literature, and its application to 
the valuation of characteristics of the land, was reviewed by King and Sinden (1994).   
Wolinsky (1987) presented a model of search and market matching.  Buyers 
and sellers search for each other, and then bargain over the difference in their bids, or 
continue their searches.  When they fail to find a match, both parties continue their 
search as long as the gain from the search exceeds the gain from continued 
bargaining.  Search, bargaining, and “matching” of buyers and sellers are central to 
exchange and price formation in farm land markets so Wolinsky’s model is now 
applied to the problem. 
The market to be modelled is one in which farmers with land for sale search 
for buyers by posting an offer price, buyers search for a property, and bargaining then 
occurs toward some kind of equilibrium.  This process is costly and the cost is a 
function of the number of properties for sale, number of potential buyers for each, and 
search intensity. 
The seller determines his offer price (SOFF) in terms of the characteristics of 
the land and other personal factors (S).  He makes the first proposal and offers his 
property for sale at an advertised price of SOFF.  The buyer determines the price he 
will bid (BBID) in terms of the same characteristics of the land, and his own personal 
situation (B).  He makes this bid known to the seller.  Then buyer and seller bargain 
over the difference in their prices (HAGL) in the “presence” of market variables (M), 
and a land value or market price (LVALUE) forms. 
The relationships among these concepts may be summarised as follows: 
 SOFF  >  BBID 
HAGL = SOFF – BBID 
LVALUE = f(SOFF, HAGL, Mi) 
 SOFF  >=  MPRICE 
BBID <=  MPRICE  13 
The advantage of this approach, over the hedonic procedures is the ability to 
differentiate valuations of characteristics by both buyer and seller and to differentiate 
behaviour of buyer and seller.  Further, the role of market factors can be introduced 
more appropriately when they apply to either seller or buyer.  The disadvantage, of 
course, is the need for primary data on BBID and SOFF, and on the characteristics of 
buyer and seller.  These extra data were explicitly collected in the present study to 
allow for this kind of analysis to improve the information available for policy. 
 
4.2 Application of the concepts 
Market behaviour can readily be analysed with these concepts, and the simultaneous 
and sequential adjustment models are two ways to do this. 
Model 2:   The simultaneous adjustment model 
  The seller determines, and advertises, an offer price (SOFF) based on (a) his 
estimates of what the buyer will bid and what the final price might be, (b) the 
characteristics of the land and (c) his seller characteristics.  The buyer determines his 
bid price (BBID) as a reaction to (a) the sellers advertised price and his perception of 
the final land price, (b) the characteristics of the land and (c) his own buyer 
characteristics.  The final price is then the result of bargaining from the sellers’ offer, 
and is influenced by the existence of market factors (Mi) such as forced sales and 
market conditions.  This behaviour may be modelled as follows. 
  SOFF  =  f(Ki,  S)       (11) 
  BBID  =  f(Ki,  B)       (12) 
  LVALUE  =  f(SOFF,  HAGL,  M)     (13) 
The model is estimated as a system of simultaneous equations. 
 
Model 3:  The sequential adjustment model 
The sequential model postulates a sequence of three discrete behaviours that 
lead to a sale.  The seller sets his advertised offer price (SOFF) as a function of the 
property characteristics and his own personal characteristics.  Then the buyer 
determines a bid (BBID) as a function of the same property characteristics and his 
personal characteristics.  Finally both parties get together to bargain to a final market 
price.   
   SOFF  =  f(Ki  ,  S)       (14) 
  BBID  =  f(Ki,  B)       (15)  14 
  LVALUE  =  f(SOFF,  HAGL,  M)     (16) 
A sequence of three separate equations is estimated. 
 
5 Data collection 
The data are now described and their descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 1. 
5.1 Choice of study area 
Farm land in Moree Plains Shire is characterised by extensive clearing of native 
vegetation (up until recently), the diversity of agriculture, and the environmental 
sensitivity of some of the remaining areas of native vegetation.  The farm land market 
is very active and 370 parcels of land over 100 hectares in size were exchanged 
between August 1995 and December 2000.  Of this total, some 180 were exchanges of 
land between different farm families and the remainder were exchanges involving 
business companies with headquarters in a state capital, transfers within a family, and 
purchases of closed roads. 
This study focuses on the 180 farm families who had bought land from other 
farm families and the first 51 of these buyers, with whom appointments could be 
made, were interviewed. The sample of 51 family farms was widely spread 
throughout the Shire, comprised some 8.2 per cent of all farmers in the Shire, and 
livestock and crop production were well represented.  The sample may therefore be 
representative of enterprise types, profitability and management skills.  All the buyers 
in this sample lived on their properties, and their farms were their main source of 
income.  They were scattered widely across the Shire and are considered 
representative of family owned and operated farms in Moree Plains Shire. 
 
5.2  Farm characteristics 
The price paid for land (LVALUE) was expressed per hectare.  Data had been 
obtained from the Valuer-General on all exchanges of land of 100 ha or larger in the 
Shire since January 1991.  Since that time, prices had been rising steadily at eight per 
cent per year, so the prices paid were inflated at this annual rate to the common date 
of December 2000.  
Gross margin, and return to capital invested in the land, are both standard 
economic measures of annual farm income.  Gross margin per hectare (GMNORM) is 
defined as:  15 
GMNORM = Gross money revenue – variable money costs     (17)   
 
The percentage return to the capital invested in the land (RLNORM) is defined as: 
 
RLNORM =  (Gross margin – fixed costs - depreciation – owners salary)/(Price paid 
for land) expressed as a percentage        (18)   
 
The owner’s salary is set at its opportunity cost, that is the foregone salary in the 
owner’s highest-paying employment elsewhere. This value was set at a conservative 
$80 000 per year before tax, as an estimate of the potential earnings in alternative 
employment such as the public service or business. 
Both measures of profit were assessed for a “normal” year, using long-term 
average yields as they applied to each farm, current costs and conservative prices as at 
December 2000.  The results are presented in terms of the normal year because they 
represent the long-term, sustainable, situation. 
The area of the purchased land was expressed in hectares (AREA). The 
distance from the nearest large town, Moree, Narrabri, or Goondiwindi, was a 
measure of the residential amenity of the purchase (DTOWN in kilometres).  Seven of 
the properties had licences to irrigate from an adjacent river or creek (IRRIG =1 if 
there is a licence, and 0 otherwise).  Sixty-three per cent of the farms had livable 
houses (HOUS=1) and thirty seven per cent had no livable house (HOUS=0). 
 
5.3 Vegetation characteristics 
Following standard definitions, native woodland was defined as vegetation where the 
tree canopy covered more than 20 per cent, but less than 100 per cent, of the ground.  
Native forest was defined as vegetation where the tree canopies touch and cover all of 
the ground.  The farmers estimated the percentages of their purchase under native 
forest, native woodland, native grassland which had not been cultivated in the last 10 
years, native grassland that had been cultivated in the last ten years, and land in 
cultivation - - all at the time of purchase.  These percentages provided useful 
descriptions of the farms as the percentage of the farm in native grassland (PCNG) 
and the percentage in native forests and woodland (PCNW).  The sum of these two is 
the total percentage of the farm area in native vegetation (PCNV), and this is the 
horizontal axis of Figure 1. 
The expected sign on PCNV is of some interest.  The simplest case is perhaps 
the buyer who is a profit-maximising crop farmer.  He will discount the price of land  16 
with native vegetation because the option to clear has been removed.  He will also 
discount it because he expects high transactions costs with DLWC if he applies for 
consent to clear and develop.  Furthermore, he will also discount for the same kind of 
transactions costs, even when he does not wish to develop, if rare and endangered 
species are found on the land.  But he will discount the price even further. When he 
purchases the land, he gives up the chance to learn more about these important 
transactions costs and so requires compensation in the form of a lower price for this 
lost opportunity (Zhao and Cling 2001).  We can use the term "precautionary 
behaviour" for these kinds of response, and so expect that native vegetation would be 
an regarded as an undesirable characteristic of the land.  Increases in PCNV will be 
associated with losses in land value and a negative sign on PCNV would be expected 
- - ceteris paribus.  The short-term loss of income, because development is limited 
because of the Act, is already part of GMNORM. 
 
5.4 Buyer and seller characteristics 
Data were collected from buyers on age (BAGE in years), and distance of purchase 
from existing homestead (DHOME in kilometres). An enterprise variable (LIVE) was 
coded as 1 if he carried livestock and 0 otherwise. Twelve of the 51 were purchases of 
whole discrete properties, and the rest were additions to existing properties (PART = 
1 if a whole and 0 if an add-on). 
The level of awareness of the activities of the Moree Regional Vegetation 
Committee was a good indication of the buyer's objective knowledge of the Act, other 
relevant legislation and local vegetation issues.  The variable AWARE was coded 
subjectively from 5 = very aware to 1 = very unaware, from the purchaser’s 
knowledge of the aims and members of committee, and his attendance at the 
committee’s events. 
To further account for selectivity bias, the variable DUTY is included in the 
bargaining approach to represent the likelihood that the buyer will conserve the native 
vegetation. The variable is calculated from the results of a logit analysis where the 
dependent variable  Z is coded as 1 = the buyer does not wish to clear, and 0 = he 
does wish to clear.  The logit model was estimated as: 
 Z j = a + f(Wj)+ uj        (19) 
where W is a vector of environmental and buyer characteristics and ui is the 
unobserved characteristics.  The characteristics W were the return on the capital  17 
invested in the land (RLNORM), percent of native woods and forests (PCWF), 
percentage of native grass land (PCNG), and awareness of implementation of the Act 
(AWARE).  The parameters of this of equation are estimated and the unstandardised 
values for DUTYj are calculated from them.  
Sellers were not interviewed, but the following information was obtained 
about them from buyers: the age of seller (SAGE in years), whether he was still in 
farming (STILL =1 if so, and 0 if not), and whether there was a relative to pass the 
property on to (PASS =1 if so and 0 otherwise). 
 
5.4 Market characteristics 
Data on the sellers offer (SOFF in dollars per hectare), the buyers bid (BBID in 
dollars per hectare, whether the seller was forced to sell (FORC =  if so, and 0 
otherwise), and the number of potential buyer (NOBY), were all obtained from the 
buyer.  A measure of the market activity would be desirable to begin to assess the 
competitiveness of the market. The number of sales in the Shire in the six moths prior 
to the sale (NOSA) is a partial indicator of this market characteristic, and a partial 
proxy for the levels of crop prices and yields.  Higher values for NOSA indicate a 
more competitive market, and of course indicate that buyers have more funds 




6.1 The models to be estimated 
The three models of market behaviour may now be specified.  
Model 1:  The basic hedonic model was specified as ; 
LVALUE = f(GMNORM, AREA, PCNV, IRRIG, DTOWN, HOUS)  (20) 
Both buyers and sellers can respond to all these variables in the process of price 
formation. 
The buyers were all from the Shire, or from a few kilometres outside.  They all 
had experienced at least one recent year with good yields and good prices, so they all 
had funds available to make the purchases but a large variation in funds was unlikely.  
Sellers are established on their farms and so are varied in the enterprises that they 
actually pursue.  But buyers face an identical range of possible enterprises, an  18 
identical set of available technologies and have equal access to technological 
information.  They were all committed to staying in the area and on their farms, 
whereas 40 per cent of the sellers moved away after the sale. Most of the buyers (76 
per cent) were purchasing additions to existing properties - - another indication that 
buyers were relatively similar in their competitive characteristics. 
There was a strong common perception amongst buyers of the problems of 
native vegetation and the problems of land with native vegetation.  There was a 
common belief that applications for consent to develop would be refused or 
drastically reduced. These perceptions were characterised by a common lack of 
information about whether vegetation included rare or threatened species, and 
uncertainty about what would happen if it did. Given these circumstances, the buyers 
seem sufficiently similar to argue that the observations of Pi (K) and Ki in the second 
stage of the hedonic approach (equation 28) will identify a demand functions for 
characteristics. 
 
Model 2: The simultaneous adjustment model comprises the three following equations 
to be solved as a system. 
SOFF = f(GMNORM, AREA, PCNV, IRRIG, DTOWN, HOUS, SAGE, STILL, PASS)  (21) 
BBID = f(GMNORM, AREA, PCNV, IRRIG, DTOWN, HOUS, BAGE, PART, DUTY, 
DHOME,  LIVE)         (22) 
LVALUE = f(SOFF, HAGL, FORC, NOSA, NOBY)        (23) 
The seller determines, and advertises, an offer price terms of his estimates of what the 
buyer will bid and what the final price might be. The buyer determines his bid price as 
a reaction to the sellers advertised price and his perception of the final land price.  
This set of simultaneous equations will be estimated as a case of Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions, also known as Zellner estimation, through three stage least squares. 
 
Model 3:  The sequential adjustment model may be specified as follows. 
SOFF = f(GMNORM, AREA, PCNV, IRRIG, DTOWN, HOUS, SAGE, STILL, PASS)  (24) 
BBID = f(GMNORM, AREA, PCNV, IRRIG, DTOWN, HOUS, BAGE, PART, DUTY, 
DHOME,  LIVE)         (25) 
LVALUE = f(SOFF, HAGL, FORC, NOSA, NOBY)        (26) 
The seller determines and advertises his offer price.  Then the buyer determines his 
bid price.  Then the buyer and seller get together, in some way, and determine the  19 
final price through bargaining.  Each equation will be estimated as a separate ordinary 
least squares model. 
 
6.2  Statistical properties of the basic hedonic model 
The basic hedonic model was estimated by ordinary least squares and is 
presented as equation (27) in Table 2.  The functional form of the model follows 
theoretical and intuitive reasoning. Observation of the data on LVALUE and PCNV 
suggested that (a) the relationship between them would follow the downward 
curvilinear trend from PCm to PCt, in the framework of Figure 1, and (b) land values 
would tend toward a minimum over a relatively large range of per cent native 
vegetation at a high level of PCNV.  The data for percent of native vegetation were 
expressed in natural logarithms to allow for this trends.  The data on AREA were also 
expressed in natural logarithms to reflect the financing and management problems of 
larger properties.  All other variables were arithmetic.   A good indication of correct 
specification is a high adjusted R squared value. The adjusted R
2 of 0.6765 is high for 
data which captures both biological and management variation, so the equation 
appears to be correctly specified. 
The data are from a cross section of farms at a given time, so there should be 
no auto-correlation and the residuals should be independent of each other. 
Nevertheless the Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated to test for possible auto-
correlation.  The statistic is 1.78, which is sufficiently near 2.0 to indicate no auto-
correlation.  The Brigalow soils in the outwash province of the east of the Moree 
Plains Shire are often described as more fertile than those in the west.  The possibility 
of a systematic east-west variation in the effect of soils on yields and on land values 
was therefore tested by re-ordering the 51 farms by easting and using the Durbin-
Watson statistic to test for auto-correlation.  There appeared to be no auto-correlation 
and so no systematic east-west soil effect. 
Heteroscedasticity can be detected by applying tests to examine the residuals. 
Judge et al (1980) discuss the forms of heteroscedasticity and the tests for it, and note 
that a major difficulty is the need to know which form is present.  The dispersion of 
land values is likely to depend on several variables, and these variables cannot be 
expected to move in the same direction. In this case, the Breusch-Pagan Test is useful.  
Greene (1997) argues that the three Glesjer Tests are more powerful in the specific  20 
context of regression models.  They test the dispersion of residuals with respect to the 
independent, explanatory variables and the constants. 
The Glesjer tests, and the Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey test based on coefficients 
of determination, were therefore applied to the hedonic model (equation 27). 
Following the Glesjer tests, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was not rejected.  
Following the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey tests, this null hypothesis was not rejected 
either.  We conclude that heteroscedasticity exerts no measurable effects on the basic 
hedonic equation. 
The independent or explanatory variables must not be correlated.  The highest 
correlation between the independent explanatory variables was 0.621 between AREA 
and HOUS.  The next highest correlation is 0.378 between AREA and DTOWN.  The 
variables GMNORM and PCNV will not be directly related.  Gross margins across 
whole properties, for a given PCNV, will still vary by enterprise choice, the 
proportions of each enterprise per farm, individual grower costs and prices.  The 
correlation coefficient between them is -0.045. 
Griffiths et al (1993, p 453) offer the following rule of thumb A correlation 
between two explanatory variables “greater than 0.80 to 0.90 indicates a…potentially 
harmful collinear relationship”.  On this basis, the correlation of 0.621 correlation is 
not harmful.  Klein (1962), supported by Huang (1970), had offered a further rule of 
thumb.  Collinearity is “tolerable” if the correlation coefficient is less than the 
coefficient of multiple determination (R).  The coefficient of multiple determination 
in equation (27) is 0.8458 so the independent variables are clearly not correlated to an 
extent that will bias the coefficients of the model. 
 
7 Results 
7.1 Influence of the conservation of native vegetation on land values 
The protection of native vegetation through the Act affects land values directly by 
reducing both short-term profitability (GMNORM) and long-term development 
options (as measured by PCNV).  The first stage hedonic equation is conventionally 
used to assess the effects in the market of marginal changes in characteristics such as 
these.  The results (equation 27 in Table 2) show that;  
• reductions in gross margin decrease land value (because of the positive sign on 
GMNORM) and,  21 
• increases in percentage of native vegetation also reduce land values (because of the 
negative sign on PCNV). 
The Act reduces GMNORM and increases PCNV, so protection of native vegetation 
is associated directly with a lower land value. 
Consider now the influence of the percentage of native vegetation by itself.  
Increases in the percentage of native vegetation on a property reduce market price in 
both Stage 1 and Stage 2 hedonic models of Table 2.  Clearly the proportion of native 
vegetation is related to land value, and land with less native vegetation brings a higher 
price.  The market as a whole therefore reduces land values as the amount of native 
vegetation rises.  But the buyers and sellers appear to assess the influence of native 
vegetation differently. In both the bargaining models (Tables 3 and 4), only the 
buyer’s bid is affected by the percentage of native vegetation on a property.  Buyers 
discount their bid according to the percentage of native vegetation on the property but 
apparently sellers do not discount their offer price in this way. 
  The second stage inverse demand function (equation 28) is used to assess 
welfare changes and the effects of non-marginal changes in a characteristic (Irwin 
2002).  The negative sign on PCNV in equation (28) shows that, native vegetation is 
an undesirable characteristic so demand is not the usual willingness to pay for extra 
units.  Rather it is the willingness to pay to avoid an extra unit of an undesirable 
characteristic - - the conventional defensive-expenditure concept of demand.  The 
demand curve is the willingness to pay, as an increase in the price, for land with one 
unit less native vegetation, at each of a range of levels of PCNV - - ceteris paribus.  
The inverse demand function (equation 28) shows that: 
•  at low levels of native vegetation, the willingness to pay is relatively high because 
one more unit of native vegetation brings with it relatively high extra transactions 
costs and proportionately more restrictions when little or none is owned already.  
•  at high levels, the willingness to pay to avoid one more unit is lower, because one 
more unit, added to the "large" amount already held brings relatively few extra 
problems. 
These trends suggest that buyers are averse to the problems of taking on any native 
vegetation at all, over the whole range of percentage native vegetation left on the 
farms.  22 
Land values, incorporating the complementary effects of GMNORM and 
PCNV, were calculated from the hedonic model of equation (27).  The average land 
value at the average proportion of native vegetation is listed first. 
  Percentage native 
vegetation 
Land value 
$ per ha 
Reduction in land value   
Per cent 
 41  793  0 
 35  814  2.6 
 25  848  7.0 
 15  883  11.4 
 5  920  16.0 
 1  939  18.4 
With the Act, a farm with 41 per cent still in native vegetation has a land value of 
$793 per hectare.  With the Act, a farm with only 5 per cent native vegetation has a 
land value of $920 per hectare. But without the Act, a farm with 41 per cent could be 
cleared to leave five per cent of its native vegetation and so have the value of $920. 
The Act therefore imposes the loss of $127 per hectare, or 16.0 per cent of land value, 
on the farmer who would leave five per cent of his native vegetation.   These data 
confirm the trends of Figure 1.  As more and more vegetation is cleared from the 
starting point of PCf, the land value steadily rises toward PCm with increasing 
marginal returns to clearing as in the figure.  Apparently, PCm is very close to PC0 for 
Moree Plains Shire.   
The area of agricultural holdings in the Shire in 1996/97 was 1.558 m hectares 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, various).  So the Shire-wide loss in land value, as 
estimated from the sample loss per hectare, is $198m ($127 per ha*1.558m). 
  These losses in land value are the opportunity costs to the farmer.  They are 
distributed unevenly - - and in a sense unfairly.  First, farmers who have kept more 
native vegetation are more disadvantaged because their opportunity cost will be 
higher.  For example, these results show that a farmer with only 35 per cent left in 
native vegetation and who wants to clear all but five per cent loses "only" 13.0 per 
cent (the foregone percentage change from 814 to 920) under the Act.  His land value 
would be 13.0 per cent higher without the Act.  But the farmer who has kept 41 per 
cent will lose 16 per cent of his land value.  Second, farmers who have more native 
vegetation will tend to have lower incomes.  They may need to clear more native 
vegetation to maintain their income but they will lose more under the Act.  A farmer  23 
who needs to clear down to 5 per cent will lose 16 per cent.  But one who needs to 
clear from 41 down to only 15 per cent will lose only 13.5 per cent.  The Act therefore 
imposes higher costs on those who have kept most vegetation, and on the poorer 
farmers who most need to clear or at least retain their options to clear and develop. 
 
7.2 Characteristics that consistently affect market price 
The following results appear consistently in the hedonic market model (equation 27) 
and/or both the bargaining models. 
• Percentage of native vegetation (PCNV) is significant and negative - - so increases 
in the proportion of native vegetation are associated with decreases in the market 
price of land, ceteris paribus. 
• Gross margin (GMNORM) was significant and positive - - so increases in gross 
margin are associated with increases in market price.   
• Area (AREA) was significant and negative - - so increases in area are associated 
with decreases in market price due to the problems of financing and managing larger 
properties. 
• The possession of an irrigation licence (IRRIG), surprisingly, did not influence price 
in any of the models.  Only 14 per cent of the properties had irrigation licences.  
• The existence of a livable house (HOUS) did not influence price in any of the 
models either.  Seventy-six per cent of the purchases were additions to existing 
properties and so a house was unnecessary. 
• The coefficient on duty of care (DUTY) is negative and significant wherever it 
occurs (Tables 2, 3, and 4).  The sign suggests that decreases in the likelihood that the 
buyer will protect the native vegetation are associated with increases in price paid - - 
perhaps crop farmers are less likely to protect and more likely to pay higher prices.  
Equally livestock farmers may be more likely to protect native vegetation (and so 
have higher values for DUTY) and be more likely to pay lower prices.  The negative 
sign on LIVE in Table 4 supports this conclusion. 
 
7.3 Differential valuation of characteristics 
Differences in significance and size of given coefficients, between buyer and seller, 
(Tables 3 and 4) suggest that buyers and sellers value characteristics differently. 
• The coefficients for PCNV are significant and negative for buyers and insignificant 
but also negative for sellers. Buyers are clearly assigning lower values to properties  24 
with larger percentages of native vegetation whereas sellers are not discounting the 
values at all (or may be only just discounting them). 
• The coefficients for GMNORM are significant and positive for both buyer and seller 
in each of the bargaining models.  But the coefficients are 14.3 per cent higher for 
sellers in Model 2 and 6.6 per cent higher for Model 3.  Sellers therefore appear to 
value production more highly than sellers.  At the time of purchase, buyers may have 
less knowledge of GMNORM than sellers and may have different attitudes to future 
incomes than sellers. 
• The coefficients for AREA are negative and significant in each of the bargaining 
models.  But the coefficient for sellers is 8.8 per cent higher for Model 2 
(simultaneous adjustment) and 17.8 per cent higher for Model 3 (sequential 
adjustment).  Apparently, sellers discount area more heavily than buyers.  At the time 
of purchase, sellers may be more aware of the problems of managing larger areas than 
the buyers. 
• Distance to town is negative and significant for sellers but insignificant for buyers. 
Apparently sellers discount price for increases in distance from town but buyers do 
not. 
  The differences in valuation of characteristics could result from the asymmetry 
of information between buyers and sellers (Scitovsky 1990).  Consider the statistically 
significant property characteristics in Tables 3 and 4.  The characteristics whose 
effects are best known to the seller are GMNORM, AREA and DIST.  Sellers weight 
these characteristics more heavily than buyers.  Indeed, DIST is significant only for 
sellers, and the sellers may be the only ones to fully know the effects of distance of 
the farm from the nearest large town. The characteristic whose effects are of more 
concern to the buyer is PCNV, and least information on this of all the characteristics 
would appear to be available to buyers.  Indeed, for buyers, considerable uncertainty 
surrounds the ability to develop land with native vegetation so they discount land 
value for this characteristic even though sellers do not.  
   
8 Discussion and conclusions 
 
8.1 The role of information and uncertainty 
The hedonic approach to valuation is based on certainty but the participants in the 
market act under degrees of uncertainty particularly as to the effects of the Act.    25 
Indeed, there is widespread concern as to whether applications to develop will be 
refused or seriously reduced.  Twenty per cent of the sample had recently applied for 
consent from the DLWC to clear.  All these applications had been rejected outright or 
significantly reduced, so that landholders now hold the consistent subjective belief 
that applications would have little success. 
The hedonic prices are based on buyer's subjective probability of such events 
rather than an objective probability of their actual likelihood. The inability of buyers 
to transform available information to probabilities may bias the hedonic estimates of 
value.  The bias may also arise from the poor quality or insufficient quantity of 
information.  Lichtenstein et al (1978), Fischoff (1975), and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) offer formal treatments of these issues.  They all suggest that subjective 
probabilities are highly sensitive to the quality and quantity of available information.  
Kask and Maani (1992) derive rules to interpret hedonic estimates of values in these 
situations. Where subjective probability (SP) is below the objective probability (OP), 
increases in information raise SP toward OP and so hedonic estimates of values are 
underestimates or lower bounds of the true values.  Where SP exceeds OP, increases 
in information reduce SP and so the estimates of value are upper limits.   
Information, on the probability that an application to develop will be accepted, 
exists in very low quantities within the Shire as everywhere else - - there are 
insufficient cases so far to offer any kind of rational, objective, systematic pattern. In 
this case, we expect increases in information to reduce the uncertainties and raise the 
currently low subjective estimates so the coefficient on PCNV may under-estimate the 
cost of the Act. 
 
8.2 The effects of variation in the data 
The relative importance of changes in the variables on land value can be assessed 
through their elasticities - - the per cent change in land value for a one percent change 
in the variable.  The elasticities on the significant variables in the hedonic equation 
(27) are GMNORM 0.205, DTOWN, 0.144, AREA -0,129, and PCNV -0.045.  The 
per cent changes in land value for a one per cent change in several other variables 
were also calculated. 
•  A one percent change in the percentage of native vegetation to be retained by the 
farmer leads to a 0.060 per cent change in land value.   26 
• A one per cent change in wheat gross margin leads to a 0.004 per cent change in 
land value, and  
•  A one percent change in cattle gross margin leads to a 0.001 per cent change in land 
value. 
Prices paid for land are therefore more responsive to changes in short-term 
profitability (GMNORM) than long-term development options (PCNV), and to 
distance to town (DTOWN) and size (AREA) rather than PCNV.  The changes in land 
value are relatively insensitive to changes in wheat and cattle gross margin, and to the 
amount of vegetation that the farmers would retain.  In fact, all these elasticities are 
low and show that changes in land value are relatively insensitive to all of these 
variables.  They also show that the estimates are most sensitive to those variables for 
which considerable data are available, objective, and readily observable (GMNORM, 
DTOWN, AREA, and PCNV). 
The loss in land value, as an opportunity cost to the farmer, appears to be 
some $127 per hectare or 16 per cent over the whole sample of 51 purchases.   This 
estimate might usefully be extended to the Shire as a whole, so the differences 
between the sample and the Shire must be identified and the loss adjusted as 
necessary.  Variations in soil type, ownership, or area of cotton, are unlikely to lead to 
important variations in the magnitudes of the losses. Extensive alluvial deposits have 
formed uniformly deep soils dominated by grey self mulching clays, across flat plains 
of uniform slope - - over all but a very small, southeastern part of the Shire.   
Differences in losses between family farms (which were sampled) and corporate 
farms (which were not sampled) depend very largely on the choice of agricultural 
enterprise and the remaining amounts of native vegetation - - and not on the 
difference in ownership per se. Indeed, the three corporate farmers, with whom the 
results were discussed, all indicated that their losses in land value were similar to 
these losses for family farms. Twenty-two per cent of the area of the Shire was under 
cotton (Australian Bureau of Statistics, various) as opposed to 21 per cent of the 
sample. 
But differences in the area of native vegetation are likely to affect the losses, 
because a higher percentage leads to a higher loss in land value with all types of 
enterprise.  Forty-eight per cent of the Shire is still under native vegetation (NSW 
Department of Land and Water Conservation 2002) as opposed to 41 per cent in the 
sample.  The Shire-wide loss in land value, with the sample loss per hectare and Shire  27 
area of 1.558m hectares, was calculated as $198m. This estimate is therefore 
conservative because the sample farms with a lower tan average percentage of native 
vegetation.  It is also lower than the loss to the community because it assumes farmers 
retain  five per cent of their native vegetation. 
 
8.3 Development of policies to conserve vegetation 
The loss in land value in More Plains Shire appears to be substantial, even with this 
conservative estimate.  The loss is high because the alternative land use of cropping is 
very productive, large areas of native vegetation remain in the Shire, and the 
government agency (DLWC) uses a high-cost decision rule to implement the Act 
(Sinden 2003).  Stewardship payments will alleviate the financial situation for some 
and property plans will provide long-term security for both farmer and vegetation.  
But the size of the likely loss in land value over the whole State would appear to be so 
large that such individual policies cannot be funded sufficiently to correct the equity 
problems that the Act has created.  The broad strategies of vegetation conservation 
must therefore be addressed first.  Do we need to retain all native vegetation and what 
is a desirable allocation of costs? 
To enhance vegetation protection, buyers should be aware of any threatened 
species on a potential purchase, and what degree of threat they are under.  Sellers 
should be required to provide this information, although buyers may end up paying 
for it in the bargaining process.   This use of the land market may provide a useful 
environmental management system (Sinden and King 1996). 
To enhance economic efficiency, information should be symmetric and clearly 
far more information is needed on the likelihood that development would be approved 
on land with native vegetation.  Due to their precautionary behaviour, buyers are 
clearly assigning lower values to properties with larger percentages of native 
vegetation whereas sellers may not be discounting the values at all.  Further, the 
extension efforts by the DLWC and the Moree Regional Vegetation Management 
Committee appear to have had little impact on the landholders behaviour or 
knowledge.  This is surprising, and suggests that the extension system also needs to 
be reviewed. 
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Table 1   Summary of descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description  Mean  Min  Max 
LVALUE  Land value, $ per ha  793  374  2033 
GMNORM  Gross margin, $ per ha  125  7  459 
RLNORM  Per cent return to capital  8.4  -16.9  29.4 
AREA  Area in hectares  1393  100  8000 
DTOWN  Distance from a major town, kms  62  18  130 
IRRIG  Irrigation licence, Yes = 1, No = 0  0.14  0  1 
HOUS  Livable house, Yes = 1, No = 0  0.63  0  1 
       
PCNV  Total per cent native vegetation   40.5  0.1  100 
PCNG  Per cent native grassland  19.9  0.1  98.7 
PCWF  Per cent native woods and forests  21.0  0  100 
       
BAGE  Buyers  age,  years  43 26 66 
DUTY  Likelihood to keep native veg., as an index  0.40  -2.4  2.6 
PART  Part (0) or whole (1) farm  0.24  0  1 
DHOME  Distance from existing homestead, kms  14  0.1  110 
LIVE  Livestock enterprise, Yes =1, No = 0  0.35  0  1 
AWARE  Awareness of relevant legislation and local 
vegetation issues, as an index where 5=very 
aware, 1=very unaware 
2.8 1  5 
       
SAGE  Sellers  age,  years  53 28 73 
STILL  Seller still in farming, Yes =1, No = 0  0.6  0  1 
PASS  Can pass farm on, Yes =1  No = 0  0.41  0  1 
       
SOFF  Sellers offer price, $ per ha  833  411  2033 
BBID  Buyers bid, $ per ha  726  330  1898 
HAGL  Difference in bids which is the subject of 
bargaining (equals SOFF - BBID), $ per ha 
107 0 395 
FORC  Forced sale, Yes =1, No = 0  0.33  0  1 
NOSA  Number of sales in Shire in last six months  45  9  70 
NOBY  Number potential buyers for farm  2  1  6 
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Table 2   The hedonic approach, with results for both stages 
 
Variables  Stage 1: the hedonic equation 
(27) 
Stage 2: the inverse demand 
function (28) 
Characteristics of the property 
GMNORM 2.842  (6.9)***  -0.0637  (2.3)** 
AREA -101.91  (2.0)**  7.826  (1.1) 
PCNV -35.548    (1.4)*  -35.433  (6.5)*** 
IRRIG 4.554  (0.1)     
DTOWN -1.8479  (1.4)*  -0.116  (0.5) 
HOUS 65.243  (0.8)     
Characteristics of the buyer 
BAGE     -0.507  (1.0) 
DUTY     -11.799  (2.0)** 
PARTW     -18.705 (1.4)* 
DHOME     -0.0963 (0.5) 
LIVE     5.258  (0.4) 
 
Constant 1330.3  70.815 
R 0.8458  0.7859 
R
2 0.7153  0.6177 
Adj R
2 0.6765  0.5338 
 
*      indicates significant at 1 per cent or better 
**   indicates significant at 5 per cent or better 
*** indicates significant at 10 per cent or better 
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Table 3   The simultaneous adjustment model (Model 2) # 
 
Variable  BBID  (29)  SOFF  (30)  LVALUE  (31) 
Characteristics of the property 
GMNORM  2.593 (6.9)***  2.963 (6.6)***     
AREA  -92.791 (2.1)** -101.040  (1.9)**    
PCNV  -45.874 (1.9)** -31.847 (1.2)     
DTOWN -1.059  (0.9)  -2.5043 (1.5)*     
IRRIG 20.087  (0.2) -11.682  (0.1)    
HOUS  16.186 (0.2)  65.658 (0.7)     
Characteristics of the buyer 
BAGE  0.0371  (0.1)      
DUTY  -32.304  (2.0)**      
PARTW  39.743  (1.1)      
DHOME  0.094  (0.2)      
LIVE  -21.726  (0.6)      
Characteristics of the seller 
SAGE    -0.720  (0.5)    
STILL    10.570  (0.3)    
PASS    37.674  (1.0)    
Characteristics of the market 
SOFF      1.0364  (58.0)*** 
HAGL      -0.569  (6.5)** 
FORC      -13.557  (1.2) 
NOSA      -0.079  (0.3) 
NOBY      -0.389  (0.1) 
        
Constant 1252.0  1369.2  -0.806 
R  0.8590 0.8400 0.9956 
R
2  0.7380 0.7052 0.9913 
 
#  The system R
2 is 0.7905 
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Table 4  The sequential adjustment model (Model 3) 
 
Variable  BBID  (32)  SOFF  (33)  LVALUE  (34) 
Characteristics of property 
GMNORM  2.650 (5.8)***  2.827 (6.1)***     
AREA  -85.324 (1.8)*  -100.56 (1.8)*     
PCNV  -63.109 (2.1)** -33.901 (1.2)     
DTOWN 0.040  (0.1)  -2.027  (1.4)*     
IRRIG -17.753  (0.2) 3.724  (0.1)    
HOUS -36.511  (0.5) 45.093  (0.5)    
Characteristics of buyer 
BAGE  0.800  (0.3)      
DUTY  -83.226  (2.4)**      
PARTW  109.96  (1.5)*      
DHOME  0.181  (0.2)      
LIVE  -91.694  (1.3)*      
Characteristics of seller 
SAGE    0.661  (0.2)    
STILL    46.923  (0.6)    
PASS    28.560  (0.4)    
Characteristics of market 
SOFF      1.029  (59.7)*** 
HAGL      -0.550  (6.5)*** 
FORC      -14.441  (1.3)* 
NOSA      -0.072  (0.3) 
NOBY      -0.767  (0.2) 
        
Constant 1212.0  1308.9  4.342 
R  0.8742 0.8421 0.9956 
R
2  0.7634 0.7092 0.9913 
Adj R
2    0.6967 0.6453 0.9903 
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Figure 1  Relationship between land value and per cent of farm still in native 
vegetation, with the Act 
 